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LOS ANGELES -- The largest wildfire in Los Angeles County
history began raging out of control on its first night after
jumping into extremely steep areas filled with thick brush that
couldn't be reached safely by firefighters, a federal review found
Friday.
The U.S. Forest Service review of decision-making during the Station Fire's first two days concluded that commanders used best professional practices while trying to knock down the blaze that began Aug. 26 in Angeles National Forest.
It said firefighters couldn't safely get into the rugged terrain where the fire spread that day, and bringing in aircraft without ground crews to help would have been ineffective.
Government documents show the number of firefighters had been reduced on the first night of the fire, opening questions about whether commanders misread the threat.
"Additional resources during the evening of August 26 and morning of August 27 would not have improved the effectiveness of operations during that operational period and would have resulted in needless exposure of firefighters to the hazards of wildland fire," the report said.
Opportunities to stop the blaze were hindered "not by the amount of suppression resources assigned to the incident, but by the inaccessibility of the fire, hazard of the terrain, and dry, dense brush conditions with extremely limited or no visibility," it concluded.
The 250-square-mile fire killed two firefighters and destroyed 89 homes.
The U.S. Forest Service review of decision-making during the Station Fire's first two days concluded that commanders used best professional practices while trying to knock down the blaze that began Aug. 26 in Angeles National Forest.
It said firefighters couldn't safely get into the rugged terrain where the fire spread that day, and bringing in aircraft without ground crews to help would have been ineffective.
Government documents show the number of firefighters had been reduced on the first night of the fire, opening questions about whether commanders misread the threat.
"Additional resources during the evening of August 26 and morning of August 27 would not have improved the effectiveness of operations during that operational period and would have resulted in needless exposure of firefighters to the hazards of wildland fire," the report said.
Opportunities to stop the blaze were hindered "not by the amount of suppression resources assigned to the incident, but by the inaccessibility of the fire, hazard of the terrain, and dry, dense brush conditions with extremely limited or no visibility," it concluded.
The 250-square-mile fire killed two firefighters and destroyed 89 homes.

